Draft: draft-ejzak-sipping-p-em-auth-00.txt Reviewer: Aki Niemi [aki.niemi@nokia.com] Review Date: Wednesday 4/12/2006 5:06 AM Review Deadline: 4/18/2006 Status: Expert review Summary: This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits that should be fixed before publication. Review: ------- I was asked to make an expert review of draft-ejzak-sipping-p-em-auth-00.txt. Please see below. ADs are also CC'd, as instructed by RFC 3427. I'm also citing the relevant portions of that RFC as reference. 1. A designated expert (as defined in RFC 2434 [4]) MUST review the proposal for applicability to SIP and conformance to these guidelines. The Expert Reviewer will send email to the Transport Area Directors on this determination. The expert reviewer can cite one or more of the guidelines that haven't been followed in his/her opinion. Yours truly. 2. The proposed extension MUST NOT define SIP option tags, response codes, or methods. Check; defines a single P-header field. 3. The function of the proposed header MUST NOT overlap with current or planned chartered extensions. The proposed mechanism in this draft relates to early media, specified in RFC3959 and RFC3960. But it is an orthogonal mechanism to early media as such, being that it is solving the authorization issue of (bidirectional) early media also mentioned in the Security Considerations of RFC3959. Therefore there is no overlap, AFAICS, to existing or planned chartered extension work in SIP. 4. The proposed header MUST be of a purely informational nature, and MUST NOT significantly change the behavior of SIP entities which support it. Headers which merely provide additional information pertinent to a request or a response are acceptable. If the headers redefine or contradict normative behavior defined in standards track SIP specifications, that is what is meant by significantly different behavior. Strictly speaking, the behavior of SIP entities is not altered, but the extension serves as an indication to controlling related media session gating. Therefore this extension isn't contradicting #4. 5. The proposed header MUST NOT undermine SIP security in any sense. The Internet Draft proposing the new header MUST address security issues in detail as if it were a Standards Track document. Note that, if the intended application scenario makes certain assumptions regarding security, the security considerations only need to meet the intended application scenario rather than the general Internet case. In any case, security issues need to be discussed for arbitrary usage scenarios (including the general Internet case). Check. The draft is explicitly scoped for systems where RFC3325 security model based on transitive trust applies. In such scenarios, the security properties are not affected by the proposed mechanism. 6. The proposed header MUST be clearly documented in an (Individual or Working Group) Informational RFC, and registered with IANA. The ABNF of the extension header field is defined, but the IANA considerations section is missing. 7. An applicability statement in the Informational RFC MUST clearly document the useful scope of the proposal, and explain its limitations and why it is not suitable for the general use of SIP in the Internet. The applicability statement does state that the extension is not suitable for the Internet at large, but is only intended for specialized deployments that have the RFC 3325 security and trust model. However, it doesn't go into details as to what are the exact reasons this mechanism couldn't have wider applicability. I suspect many of those reasons have to do with coupling of signaling and media resources, and especially the charging model of those media resources. Since this coupling can not be made in the general case, the authorization decisions can not be made based on signaling alone. So in conclusion, it seems this proposed extension is in line with the criteria of RFC 3427. The only thing missing is the IANA considerations section, which should make a registration of a new SIP header field. As a side comment, the draft also doesn't explain what would happen in a scenario where early media is not allowed, indicated by "P-Early-Media: inactive", and is therefore gated off; yet the UAC doesn't support the proposed extension. How does it handle getting silence while expecting early media? Also a nit: the short draft title says P-Early-Media-Auth, but the header field is called P-Early-Media.