



*Performance from Experience*

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# SIP Extensions for Caller Identity, Privacy, and Operator Services

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**AT&T, CableLabs, 3Com, Cisco, Com21, General Instrument,  
Lucent Cable, NetSpeak, Telcordia**

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# Calling Identity - PSTN

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- ◆ Calling Identity items
  - Calling Number
  - Calling Name
- ◆ Terminating switch must be able to identify calling party, e.g., for call trace, thus calling party identity must be passed.
- ◆ Calling Identity Delivery services allow the called party to obtain calling identity information about the calling party
  - MUST be able to trust validity of information delivered
  - PSTN is trusted intermediary
- ◆ Calling Identity Delivery Blocking (CIDB) features allow the calling party to control the presentation of calling identity items
  - MUST be able to trust that calling identity information is not revealed
  - PSTN is trusted intermediary

# Calling Identity - SIP

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- ◆ Calling Identity needed for
  - Calling Identity Delivery services
  - Customer originated trace (regulatory requirement)
- ◆ From header may be encrypted for privacy or other reasons
  - Cannot be modified since part of CallId
- ◆ Calling identity could (mis)use “display-name” in From header field but suggest using new “Caller” header field instead:

```
Caller =          "Caller" ":" [ display-name ";" ]
                Caller-Number [ "/" Caller-Type]
                [ "<" addr-spec ">" ]

Caller-Type =    token

Caller-Number =  local-phone-number | "private"
                | "not-subscribed" | "not-available"
```

## Calling Identity - SIP, cont.

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- ◆ SIP User Agents residing on customer premise cannot be trusted to provide accurate “Caller” information.
- ◆ DCS-Proxy can be trusted and act as intermediary though:
  - Ensures “Caller” provided by User Agent is valid.
  - Adds “Caller” information when not provided by User Agent to enable call trace.
- ◆ If the User Agent wants to suppress calling identity delivery:
  - UA could do this implicitly by not providing “Caller” to the DCS-proxy (but DCS-proxy still needs to support call trace), however:
    - » May need to identify a particular endpoint from a SIP user agent although “From” header field encrypted
    - » May need to signal other types of privacy
  - Better to Explicitly indicate that calling identity is to be suppressed with a separate header field.

## Calling Identity - SIP, cont.

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- ◆ Also, to maintain complete privacy and anonymity, it must be possible to suppress all location information:
  - IP-addresses can reveal some location information:
    - » Some IP-addresses may be mapped to approximate physical location
    - » The fact that an IP-address used is different from what it normally is may reveal location information, e.g. working from home versus in office.
- ◆ IP-address hiding can be obtained by adding a level of indirection by a trusted intermediary (anonymizer).
- ◆ Thus, in an IP environment, Calling Identity items include:
  - Calling Number
  - Calling Name
  - IP-address

## Calling Identity - SIP, cont.


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- ◆ DCS-proxies must be able to be told what level of privacy to provide:
  - By SIP User Agents
  - By other DCS-proxies
- ◆ New header field “Anonymity” proposed to signal this:

```
Anonymity = "Anonymity" ":" *privacy-tag
```

```
privacy-tag = "Full" | "Caller-Num" | "Caller-Name"  
             | "IPAddr" | "Off"
```

# Calling Number Blocking Call Flow





# Privacy - Other Issues to Consider

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- From header field
  - » May be encrypted.
  - » Set “display-name” to anonymous before forwarding to User Agent.
- Contact header field
  - » Point to anonymizer
- Via header fields
  - » May be encrypted or removed statefully by proxies
- Call-ID
  - » Should not be based on endpoint’s IP-address
- SDP
  - » Several fields include IP-address and user information, e.g. owner
- RTCP
  - » Some messages may include user information, e.g. NAME

# Supporting Operator Services

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- ◆ Need to support operator services:
  - Want to reuse existing operator services facilities and infrastructure.
  - PSTN operator may be unaware that the call is to a destination on the IP network.
- ◆ Busy Line Verify (BLV) and Emergency Interrupt (EI) require special treatment:
  - No test trunk (in PSTN), i.e. do not return busy, regardless of line-state.
  - Allow operator, and only operator, to listen in.
  - Allow operator, and only operator, to break in.
- ◆ Requirements:
  - Ability to indicate that special call processing (BLV/EI) is to be applied.
  - BLV and EI invades privacy and should only be extended to operators.

## Supporting Operator Services, cont.

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- ◆ Suggest new header field “OSPS” to signal special operator services operations:

```
OSPS = "OSPS" ":" OSPS-Tag
```


```
OSPS-Tag = "BLV" | "EI"
```

- ◆ Include a “Caller-Type” in “Caller” to enable endpoint to decide if special privileges should be honored:

```
Caller = "Caller" ":" [ display-name ";" ]  
Caller-Number [ "/" Caller-Type ]  
[ "<" addr-spec ">" ]
```

- ◆ Only Caller-Type defined currently is “Operator”.

# Busy Line Verify Call Flow



# Emergency Interrupt Call Flow

