Document: draft-ietf-ecrit-location-hiding-req-01 Reviewer: Ben Campbell Review Date: 20090507 IETF LC End Date: 20090511 IESG Telechat date: (if known) Summary: This document is almost ready for publication as an informational RFC. There are some minor clarity issues where the reader is left to infer some things that could be more explicit. Major issues: None Minor issues: -- 1.1, last paragraph: Can you expand on how withholding information information needed for call routing concretely differs from withholding information from emergency personnel? I assume there is more to this than the intent of the ISP. Also, by saying an ISP is "not interested", I think the point is to say that they have legal obligations to disclose to emergency personnel, regardless of any interest otherwise, right? -- 1.2, first paragraph: I think this leaves out what I assume to be the actual problem statement, which is we need a way that an ISP/IAP can hide location info from the user agent of the VSP in such a fashion that it is still available for PSAP routing, correct? I can infer that pretty easily, but I don't see where it is explicitly stated in one place. Is there a case where an ISP is simply unable to provide location information? I assume that would be out of scope for this document, but it should be stated as such. -- 1.3, fourth paragraph: This paragraph could be more clear--how does the PSAP having credentials meet a requirement to _hide_ information? I infer the assumption is that the caller does _not_ have the necessary credentials. If so, it would be better to state it explicitly -- Fifth paragraph: is compatibility with LoST a requirement? -- Req-B Is it appropriate for this document to put requirements on the ISP/ IAP? Or do you mean to say they MUST be _able_ to support this, while hiding information location from the VSP and/or UA? -- Req-C I don't really understand what is being said here. Is the point to say that they must be able to validate that the URI identifies a "bona fide" emergency service contact, and that a call to that URI actually routes to the right place? How does this interact with the later requirement that the entities need not be SIP aware? -- Req-D this is stated as a requirement on the ISP rather than a statement about the solution. I _think_ you are saying there is a requirement to be _able_ to provide location info to the PSAP while withholding it from the caller. Is that correct?. Also how does "by value or by reference" interact with the previous statement concerning LoST requiring LbyV? -- Req-5 How does the requirement that the ISP/IAP not need to know SIP interact with the statement in Req-D that the ISP must be able to determine if a call is being routed to a bona-fide location service? Also, does Req-5 imply a requirement to work with non-SIP VoIP services? -- Req-6 What does it mean for a PSAP boundary to have holes? -- Req 12: "Minimal impact" is vague--can you add clarifying text to make this more concrete? -- Req 15: Is that really a requirement, or just an observation of fact? -- Security Considerations: I'm a little skeptical of this statement that this does not raise additional considerations. For example, would you consider that a human might be endangered because an ISP wanted to reserve location information as a "for pay" service a security consideration, in that it requires the solution to be more fail-safe than other protocols? On the other hand, is the need to keep the UA from inferring location when an ISP wants to hide it a security consideration? Nits/editorial comments: -- Abstract, paragraph 2: It's not clear to me that the document described architectural impacts. It refers to architecture, but I don't see explicit statements about how the architecture breaks if the ISP is not willing to disclose. -- 1.1, list item "3." Please expand VSP on first use. -- Req-A: I don't think the requirement is to be able to withold location from "any entity it wishes", since that would include the PSAP, etc. -- Req-2: "jurisdiction of the PSAP" Geographical jurisdiction? -- Req-10: The solution MUST allow the end host to determine PSAP/ ESRP URLs prior to the call, for all emergency services. Who is the "end host"? -- 3.3, first bullet: Is it appropriate to have "MUST"s in a section on "desirable properties"? -- Third bullet: That's an implementation detail. I think you mean to say something to the effect of the presence of NATs SHOULD not break the mechanism. -- idnits reports the following (which I include without prejudice): idnits 2.11.11 tmp/draft-ietf-ecrit-location-hiding-req-01.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** It looks like you're using RFC 3978 boilerplate. You should update this to the boilerplate described in the IETF Trust License Policy document (see http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info), which is required from December 16, 2008. Version 1.34 of xml2rfc can be used to produce documents with boilerplate according to the mentioned Trust License Policy document. -- Found old boilerplate from RFC 3978 Section 5.1 on line 22. -- Found old boilerplate from RFC 3978 Section 5.5 updated by RFC 4748 on line 377. -- Found old boilerplate from RFC 3979 Section 5 paragraph 1 on line 388. -- Found old boilerplate from RFC 3979 Section 5 paragraph 2 on line 395. -- Found old boilerplate from RFC 3979 Section 5 paragraph 3 on line 401.